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Abstract
Preferences among acts are analyzed in the
style of L. Savage, but as partially ordered.
The rationality postulates considered are
weaker than Savage’s on three counts. The
Sure Thing Principle is derived in this set-
ting. The postulates are shown to lead to
a characterization of generalized qualitative
probability that includes and blends both
traditional qualitative probability and the
ranked structures used in logical approaches.
1 INTRODUCTION
In [Savage, 1954], Savage showed that a set of postu-
lates concerning rational decisions in the face of uncer-
tainty implies that the decider acts as if he/she were
maximizing the expectation of some utility function.
His postulates imply that a decider gives subjective
probabilities, that obey the laws of the calculus of
probabilities, to each event. The impact of his results
have been felt very strongly and have strengthened the
idea that rationality is maximization of expected util-
ity and that subjective probabilities obey the laws of
the calculus of probabilities. A number of researchers,
though, have contested each of those two points: A.
Wald, prior to Savage, has defended a maximin strat-
egy irreconcilable with maximization of expected util-
ity, and the Dempster-Shafer approach, among many
others, rejects the idea that subjective probabilities
are probabilities. In this paper, an approach closely
following Savage’s is pursued. Some of his assump-
tions are weakened and an exact characterization of
subjective probabilities is obtained.
Three main criticisms may be raised against three of
Savage’s postulates.
• In P1, Savage [Savage, 1954] requires preference
to be a simple order (which is a misnomer since,
contrary to expectations, it does not imply it
is an order relation). He recognizes that this a
very strong assumption and writes “There is some
temptation to explore the possibilities of analyz-
ing preference among acts as a partial ordering,
that is, in effect to replace part 1 of the definition
of simple ordering by the very weak proposition
f ≤ f , admitting that some pairs of acts are in-
comparable. This would seem to give expression
to introspective sensations of indecision or vacil-
lation, which we may be reluctant to identify with
indifference. My own conjecture is that it would
prove a blind alley losing much in power and ad-
vancing little, if at all, in realism; but only an en-
thusiastic exploration could shed real light on the
question.” This work is a first step in this pos-
sibly blind alley. Further work is needed on the
utility theory for generalized qualitative probabil-
ity structures.
This assumption implies that, if a decider is un-
decided between two acts f and g, and also unde-
cided between g and h, then he/she is undecided
between f and h. In many realistic situations,
in which the decider has only partial information,
this property cannot be expected to hold. Con-
sider, for example, a choice between betting heads
in one of three different coin tosses. Coin 1 is be-
lieved to be fair. Coins 2 and 3 are unknown, i.e.,
not believed to be fair, but coin 2 is known to land
heads more often than coin 3. In such a situation
a decider may well be undecided between coins 1
and 2 and also between coins 1 and 3, but defi-
nitely prefer coin 2 to coin 3. A criticism of the
same nature may be found in [Aumann, 1962], al-
though framed in the von Neumann-Morgenstern
setting [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947].
There are two different reasons one may object to
this completeness assumption. The first one, be-
hind [Aumann, 1962], is that one may doubt that
consequences may be totally pre-ordered, mainly
because consequences may be multi-dimensional
(e.g., time and money, human lives and money, or
just a very high dimensional space) and one may
be either reluctant to trade one dimension for the
other or just incapable of describing a total pre-
order in a very rich space. Such a concern is at
the basis of a large body of work on decision in a
many-criteria environment.
The second reason is that one may doubt that
subjective probabilities may be exactly described
(i.e., events totally pre-ordered), because of one’s
uncertainty about what is unknown, or because
one may be reluctant to compare subjective prob-
abilities of events pertaining to very different
realms, e.g., the probability of a Republican presi-
dent being elected in 1996 (Savage’s example) and
that of a coin landing “heads”. Such a concern is
at the basis of a large body of work on decision in
uncertain environments.
The results of this paper do not depend on the
source of incompleteness. It has been elaborated
with the second point of view in mind, though.
• Savage’s treatment of null events is disputable
since it does not allow for events that are null
relatively to other null events. As any treatment
based on probabilities, or reducible to them, it
allows conditioning on an event H only if the
probability of H is positive. This point is made
in [Blume et al., 1991] where non-archimedean
probability structures are proposed, in the frame-
work of a total pre-order. There, reference is
made to [Blackwell and Dubins, 1975] and de
Finetti [de Finetti, 1972] is quoted as saying:
“there seems to be no justification . . . for intro-
ducing the restriction P (H) 6= 0”.
• It follows from Savage’s postulate P4 that if a con-
sequence c is strictly preferred to a consequence
d, and if the act of winning c in case of an event
A and winning d otherwise is strictly preferred to
winning c in case of an event B and winning d
otherwise, then the act of winning c′ in case of A
and winning d′ otherwise is strictly preferred to
winning c′ in case of B and winning d′ otherwise,
for any consequences c′, d′ such that c′ is stricly
preferred to d′. This seems too strong. One may,
rationally, strictly prefer winning $1M on A and
winning $0 otherwise to winning $1M on B and
winning $0 otherwise, be undecided between win-
ning 1c on A and $0 otherwise or winning 1c on B
and $0 otherwise, and still prefer a sure win of 1c
to nothing. The treatment of subjective probabil-
ities in [Anscombe and Aumann, 1963], similarly,
includes no anologue to P4. Note Savage’s pes-
simistic outlook in [Savage, 1954, p. 30, Section
2]: “Though I have not explored the latter possi-
bility carefully, I suspect that any attempt to do
so formally leads to fruitless and endless regres-
sion”.
This work presents postulates, in the style of Savage,
that are weak enough to answer all three criticisms
above. Nevertheless, those postulates enable a full
characterization of the structure of subjective proba-
bilities.
2 DECISION IN THE FACE OF
UNCERTAINTY
Notations follow those of [Savage, 1954]. S is a non-
empty set of states. Subsets of S are noted A, B, C,
. . . and called events. We follow Savage in assuming
that every subset of S is an event, i.e., measurable.
The treatment of the general case, in which the mea-
surable subsets of S form only a sub-algebra of the
power set of S poses no serious problems. F is a set
of consequences, denoted c, d, . . .. Acts are arbitrary
functions from S to F , denoted by f , g, h, . . ..
A basic problem with Savage’s treatment is the elimi-
nation of the event of reference, i.e., the event on which
the decider conditions, from the formalization. The
preference relation shall here be indexed by an arbi-
trary event. For every event A: f ≤A g means that,
given A, either g is strictly preferred to f or one is
indifferent between f and g. The reason for this richer
formalism is not a rejection of the Sure Thing Princi-
ple, which is accepted and derived, but the rejection
of Savage’s idea that comparing two acts that agree on
A¯ is enough to compare them given A. If A is negligi-
ble with respect to A¯, acts may be equivalent (on the
whole set S) but not given A.
Notice also that the intuitive meaning of ≤ is prefer-
ence or indifference, as in [Aumann, 1962], and not
non-preference as in [Savage, 1954]. In this way, any
two acts may stand in four possible situations:
• f ≤A g and g 6≤A f , i.e., g is strictly prefered to
f , given A, which will be denoted f <A g,
• g ≤A f and f 6≤A g, i.e., f is strictly prefered to
g, given A, which will be denoted g <A f ,
• f ≤A g and g ≤A f , i.e., f and g are indifferent,
given A, which will be denoted f ∼A g, or
• f 6≤A g and g 6≤A f , i.e., one is undecided between
f and g, given A.
We propose, in this work, two weakenings of Savage’s
postulates: a partial pre-order in place of a total pre-
order, and the consideration of events that are negligi-
ble with respect to other events (that may be negligi-
ble with respect to a third class of events). Those two
weakenings are essentially orthogonal, and one may
study either one of them in isolation. The postulates
proposed will be presented and discussed now. The
first two postulates require the preference relation, on
any event A, to be a pre-order.
(Q0) f ≤A f.
(Q1) f ≤A g, g ≤A h ⇒ f ≤A h.
Notice that the relation ≤A does not satisfy the first
property of the definition of a simple ordering on p.18
of [Savage, 1954], i.e., either f ≤A g or g ≤A f , but sat-
isfies the second property, i.e., transitivity. Postulates
(Q0) and (Q1) are therefore strictly weaker than Sav-
age’s (P1). It clearly follows from (Q0) and (Q1) that,
on any event A, <A is irreflexive and transitive, i.e., a
strict partial order, and that ∼A is reflexive, symmet-
ric and transitive, i.e., an equivalence relation. Notice
that the event A may be empty: f is not strictly pre-
ferred to f , even if the empty event obtains, but one is
indifferent between f and itself even if the empty event
obtains. It also follows from (Q0) and (Q1) that indif-
ferent acts behave in exactly the same way concerning
the preference relation, i.e., if f ∼A g then
f ∼A g, h <A f, f <A k ⇒ h <A g, g <A k.
So far, all postulates considered one fixed event A. The
next postulates deal with the influence of the event A
in the relation <A. First, preferences on A should not
depend on the values of the acts f and g outside A.
Definition 1 Acts f , g are said to be equivalent on
event A iff for every s ∈ A, f(s) = g(s). This will be
denoted by f =A g.
Our postulate says only that, given A, one should be
indifferent between acts that are equivalent on A.
(Q2) f =A g ⇒ f ∼A g.
Notice that (Q2) implies (Q0). A consequence of (Q2)
is that equivalent acts are indeed equivalent with re-
spect to the preference relation.
Lemma 1 If f =A f
′ and g =A g
′, then f ≤A g im-
plies f ′ ≤A g′.
Another consequence is that the preference order on
the empty event is trivial.
Lemma 2 ∀h, h′, h ≤∅ h
′ and therefore h 6<∅ h
′.
Events different from the empty event may yield a triv-
ial relation: such events will be called null events.
Definition 2 An event A is null iff, ∀h, h′, h ≤A h′.
Definition 2 is similar in spirit with Savage’s definition
of null events, but technically different, since the for-
malism used here is richer and we may conditionalize
explicitly on the event A. The next two postulates
consider two disjoint events A and B (this assumption
is essential), and two acts f and g that are indiffer-
ent given B. Postulate (Q3) assumes information on
the preferences on A to deduce information concern-
ing the preferences on A ∪B. Postulate (Q4) assumes
information on A ∪B and deduces information on A.
(Q3) A ∩B = ∅, f ≤A g, f ∼B g ⇒ f ≤A∪B g
If one is indifferent between f and g given B and ei-
ther indifferent or prefers g given A, one should be
indifferent between them given A ∪B or prefer g, one
could not reasonably prefer f or even be undecided.
The condition A ∩B = ∅ is essential. If it were not
satisfied, it could be the case that one prefers g to f
on the intersection of A and B, f being preferred to
g on the symmetric difference. In such a case, it may
well be the case that f is overall preferred to g on the
union, but g is preferred to f on both A and B.
Corollary 1 If A ∩B = ∅, f ∼A g and f ∼B g, then
f ∼A∪B g.
Some notation will be helpful for our next postulate.
We shall say that A is negligible compared to B if A
and B are disjoint and the relations of indifference and
preference on the union A ∪B are exactly as on B.
Definition 3 Assume A ∩B = ∅. We shall say that
A is negligible compared to B and write ANB if ∀h, h′,
h ≤A∪B h′ ⇔ h ≤B h′.
Notice that ANB implies that ∀h, h′, h ∼A∪B h′ iff
h ∼B h′ and h <A∪B h′ iff h <B h′. We may now ex-
press our next postulate. Suppose A and B are dis-
joint. Suppose also that, on the union A ∪B, g and
f are indifferent or g is preferred, and that, on B, g
and f are indifferent. Then two cases may arise: ei-
ther f ≤A g, explaining, in accordance with (Q3) that
f ≤A∪B g, or A is negligible with respect to B.
(Q4) A ∩B = ∅, f ≤A∪B g, f ∼B g ⇒
either f ≤A g or ANB.
Corollary 2 If A ∩B = ∅, f ∼A∪B g and f ∼B g,
then either f ∼A g or ANB.
Our next corollary says that if g is strictly preferred
to f on A, but f and g are indifferent on B, then two
cases may occur: either A is not negligible w.r.t. B
and g is strictly preferred to f on the union A ∪B,
or, A is negligible w.r.t. B, and therefore f and g are
indifferent on A ∪B.
Corollary 3 If A ∩B = ∅, f <A g and f ∼B g, then
either f <A∪B g or ANB. Notice that, in the second
case, f ∼A∪B g.
If g is strictly preferred to f on the union, but f and
g are indifferent on B, g must be preferred to f on A.
Corollary 4 If A ∩B = ∅, f <A∪B g and f ∼B g,
then f <A g.
Lemma 3 Assume A ∩B = ∅. If f ≤A g and
f ≤B g, then f ≤A∪B g.
Proof: Let
h(s) =
{
g(s) if s ∈ A
f(s) otherwise.
(1)
We have, by (Q2), h ∼A g and h ∼B f . Therefore
f ≤A h and f ∼B h. By (Q3), then f ≤A∪B h. Sim-
ilarly, h ∼A g and h ≤B g and, therefore, h ≤A∪B g.
By (Q1), then, f ≤A∪B g.
One may now prove a result similar to Lemma 3 for
strict preferences.
Lemma 4 Assume A ∩B = ∅. If f <A g and
f <B g, then f <A∪B g.
A property stronger than postulate (Q4) may be con-
sidered by not allowing the second possibility in the
conclusion:
(Q′4) A ∩B = ∅, f ≤A∪B g, f ∼B g ⇒ f ≤A g.
This property is consistent with the postulates since
it is satisfied by models in which acts are compared
by their expectations. We shall now show that the
postulates above imply Savage’s Sure Thing Principle
(Postulate P2).
Lemma 5 Let A ∩B = ∅. If f =A f ′,
g =A g
′, f =B g and f
′ =B g
′, then f ≤A∪B g implies
f ′ ≤A∪B g′.
Proof: By (Q2), we have f ∼A f ′, g ∼A g′, f ∼B g
and f ′ ∼B g
′. If ANB, then f ′ ∼B g
′ implies
f ′ ∼A∪B g′. We may, therefore, without loss of gener-
ality, assume that A is not negligible with respect to B.
Since f ≤A∪B g and f ∼B g, (Q4) then implies, since
A is not negligible with respect to B, that f ≤A g.
Therefore f ′ ≤A g′ and, by (Q3), f ′ ≤A∪B g′.
The next two postulates deal with the constant acts,
i.e., with the preference ordering on consequences.
Definition 4 An act f is constant iff for any s, t ∈ S,
f(s) = f(t).
A constant act f may be identified with the conse-
quence f(s) for s ∈ S. Preferences on constant acts
are independent of the event considered.
(Q5) If c, d are constants and A is not null,
and c ≤A d, then for any event B, c ≤B d.
Postulate (Q5) is a slight strengthening of Savage’s
(P3), since, in the latter, the condition on A is that A
be not null, whereas (Q5) uses the stronger condition
A non-empty. This strengthening is not significant for
two reasons:
• we could use a weaker version of (Q5), introducing
the notion of a null event as in Savage, and
• null events may be treated as events of positive
probability infinitesimally close to zero.
From here on, preference between constants will be
denoted ≤ without subscript. The restriction that A
be non-null is clearly crucial since, otherwise, for any
h, h′, h ≤A h′.
Our last postulate ensures non-triviality: there are two
constants, i.e., consequences, one of them preferred to
the other.
(Q6) There are constants c, d such that d < c.
Notice that we do not assume the set F of conse-
quences is totally or even modularly ordered (i.e.,
d < c implies that, for any e, either d < e or e < c).
Notice also that we have no postulate similar to Sav-
age’s (P4). The next section will show that any system
of preferences and indifferences that satisfies (Q1)–
(Q6) yields a binary relation on events that enables
us to compare the (generalized) probability of events.
This relation enjoys extremely interesting properties.
3 GENERALIZED QUALITATIVE
PROBABILITY
Postulates (Q5) and (Q6) deal with constant acts, i.e.,
acts that take only one single value. Of special impor-
tance are also acts that take only two different values.
Suppose c and d are different consequences and that
f is an act that takes only values c and d, i.e., on
some event A, f takes value c and on the complement
of A, A¯, it takes value d. Let us devise the following
notation:
w
c,d
A (s) =
{
c if s ∈ A
d otherwise.
(2)
Assuming d < c, wc,dA “wins” on A, i.e., gets on A the
high pay-off c and “loses”, i.e., gets the low pay-off d
on A¯. The following may be shown.
Lemma 6 If A ∪B ⊆ D, wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B implies
w
c,d
A ≤D w
c,d
B .
The meaning of wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B is: winning on B is
preferred to or indifferent with winning on A. Could
it be that preferences depend on the prizes c and d? In
many circumstances, probably not, and Savage has a
postulate, (P4), on p. 31 to that effect. In the present
framework, we may easily formalize this by: if d < c
and d′ < c′, then
(R) wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B ⇒ w
c′,d′
A ≤A∪B w
c′,d′
B
A restricted version, in which A and B are assumed
to be disjoint, is equivalent. A difference between (R)
and (P4) should be noted: (R) is relativized to A ∪B,
as is our constant policy.
We shall, after some discussion, reject this postulate,
but let us see, first, the argument in its favor. If one
prefers to win on B than to win on A, this should
not depend on the prizes offered: if two horses are at
equal odds and one prefers to wage $1,000 on one of
them, “archie” than on the other one , “belle”, then
one must also prefer to wage $1 on “archie” than on
“belle”. The reason is clearly that one must think that
the chances of “archie” winning are better than those
of “belle” winning, and this enough to convince us to
strictly prefer waging even a small sum on “archie”
than on “belle”, at least if the small sum is big enough
to be strictly preferred to $0.
Now, the argument against (R). Suppose A is an event,
e.g., the result of a lottery, for the probability of which
one has a precise and reliable estimation. Suppose, on
the contrary, one has only a very fuzzy estimation of
the probability of B. A rational decider may well, if
the sum involved is small, prefer to bet on B than on
A, but prefer to bet on A if the sum involved is large.
Similarly, the choice of A or B may depend on whether
a gain or a loss is expected.
As explained above, we do not accept (R). Given a
system of preferences and indifferences, one may nat-
urally define a relation on events.
Definition 5 We shall say that A is not more plausi-
ble than B, and write A ≤ B iff ∀c, d, such that d < c,
one has wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B . The relation ≤ on events will
be said to be defined by the preference structure ≤− on
acts.
The meaning of Definition 5 is he following: if one
prefers betting on B than on A, whatever the prize is,
it must be because one considers B as more probable
than A.
Let us now consider the consequences of Definition 5.
First, one prefers losing on a less probable event than
on a more probable event.
Lemma 7 If A ≤ B, then c ≤ d ⇒ wc,dB ≤A∪B w
c,d
A .
Proof: For d ∼ c, by (Q5) and (Q2), wc,dA ∼A−B w
c,d
B
and wc,dA ∼B−A w
c,d
B . Since w
c,d
A =A∩B w
c,d
B , by
(Q2) and Corollary 1, we see that wc,dA ∼A∪B w
c,d
B .
For c < d, by Definition 5, wd,cA ≤A∪B w
d,c
B . Let
f = wd,cA , g = w
d,c
B , f
′ = wc,dB and g
′ = wc,dA . Let
also D = (A−B) ∪ (B −A) and E = A ∩B. We
have: D ∩ E = ∅, f =D f
′, g =D g
′, f =E g and
f ′ =E g
′. Lemma 5 (The Sure Thing Principle) says
that f ≤D∪E g implies f ′ ≤D∪E g′.
Before embarking on a study of the properties of the
relations ≤ on events, one would like to be convinced
that the postulates (Q1)–(Q6) are consistent and con-
sider some models for them. Let F be the unit interval
and assume S is a probability space, in which every
event is measurable. Let any event of probability zero
be null, and for A of positive probability, define f ≤A g
iff the expected value of f conditioned on A is less or
equal to that of g conditioned on the same event. It
is easy to see that all postulates are satisfied, and it is
worth noticing that the stronger property (Q’4) is also
satisfied. The restriction that the empty event be the
only event of probability zero is needed because (Q5)
is a slight strengthening of Savage’s (P3). Another,
perhaps more interesting and more widely applicable,
model of the postulates is obtained if one considers a
non-standard probability measure on S in which every
event is measurable and the empty event is the only
event of probability zero. Notice that we may have
non-empty events of infinitesimally small probability.
Notice also that we take F to be the standard unit
interval and do not allow infinitesimally small conse-
quences. For A of positive probability, define f <A g
iff the expected value of f conditioned on A is less than
that of g conditioned on the same event, and the dif-
ference is not infinitesimal. If A has zero probability,
it is a null event. A third way of generating preferences
is the following. Assume S is totally ordered in a way
every event has a maximum. Intuitively s < t means
that state t is more plausible than s to such an extent
that, given an event that contains both, one should
not be influenced by the consequences on s. Given an
event A, let sA be the maximal element of A. Given
two acts f and g and an event A, we shall compare f
and g on A by the values they take on sA: f ≤A g iff
f(sA) ≤ g(sA).
We are now going to prove properties of the relation ≤
on events. They parallel the definition of qualitative
probability given by Savage in [Savage, 1954, page 32]
and will be used as the definition of generalized qualita-
tive probabilities given in Definition 6. Our first lemma
states that ≤ is a pre-order.
Lemma 8 The relation ≤ on events is reflexive and
transitive.
As usual we shall write
• A ∼ B for A ≤ B and B ≤ A, and
• A < B for A ≤ B and B 6≤ A.
The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation and < is a
strict partial order. Lemma 8 generalizes part 1 of the
definition of qualitative probability in [Savage, 1954,
p. 32]: ≤ is a simple ordering. We now prove results
that parallel part 2 there: B ≤ C iff B ∪D ≤ C ∪D,
provided B ∩D = C ∩D = ∅. D. Dubois remarked,
some time ago, that the two directions implied by the
“if and only if” there were not at all equally obvious,
or desirable. The “only if” part seems inescapable,
and we prove now it holds for generalized qualitative
probability.
Lemma 9 Let A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅. If A ≤ B, then
A ∪D ≤ B ∪D.
The “if” part does not hold in our framework. A
weaker property will be presented in Lemma 12 but,
first, the exact counterpart of the first part of part 3 of
the definition of qualitative probability. We now prove
properties that parallel property 3 there.
Lemma 10 For any event A, ∅ ≤ A.
Corollary 5 If A ⊆ B, then A ≤ B.
The following will be helpful.
Lemma 11 If A ∩B = ∅, then ANB iff
(B ∪ A) ≤ B.
Proof: Let A and B be disjoint. Suppose,
first, that ANB. Assume d < c. We must
show that wc,dB∪A ≤B∪A w
c,d
B . But this follows from
w
c,d
B∪A =B w
c,d
B .
Assume, now, that (B ∪ A) ≤ B. By (Q6) there
are constants, c and d, such that d < c. We have
w
c,d
B∪A ≤B∪A w
c,d
B . But w
c,d
B∪A =B w
c,d
B , and (Q2) and
(Q4) imply that either wc,dB∪A ≤A w
c,d
B , or ANB. In
the second case, we are through. In the first case,
c ≤A d, and, by (Q5), A is null, and therefore ANB.
We may now present the lemma announced above.
Lemma 12 Let A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅. If
A ∪D ≤ B ∪D and (D ∪B) 6≤ D, then A ≤ B.
Our last lemma is more original: it is a strengthening
of the property ∅ < S of the definition of subjective
probability. It expresses the fact that a sum must be
greater than at least one of its parts.
Lemma 13 If A and B are disjoint events, A ≤ B
and A ∪B ≤ A, then, A and B are null events.
Proof: Let A ∩B = ∅, A ≤ B and A ∪B ≤ A.
Let d < c, as guaranteed by (Q6). We know that
w
c,d
A∪B ≤A∪B w
c,d
A , and w
c,d
A∪B ∼A w
c,d
A . By (Q4), ei-
ther wc,dA∪B ≤B w
c,d
A , i.e., c ≤B d, implying B is a null
event, or BNA. In both cases, then, wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B
implies A ∪B is a null event. A subset of a null event
is a null event.
The following corollary says that a non-null event, and
in particular S, is strictly larger than the empty set.
Corollary 6 An event A is null iff A ≤ ∅.
We may now encapsulate the properties above in a
definition. It strictly generalizes the definition of qual-
itative probability[Savage, 1954, p. 32].
Definition 6 A reflexive and transitive relation ≤ on
the subsets of S is a generalized qualitative probability
iff:
1. A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅, A ≤ B ⇒ A ∪D ≤ B ∪D,
2. A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅, A ∪D ≤ B ∪D,
D ∪B 6≤ D ⇒ A ≤ B,
3. if A ∩B = ∅, A ≤ B and A ∪B ≤ A, then B ≤ ∅,
4. for any event A, ∅ ≤ A.
Notice that we do not ask that A ≤ B imply B¯ ≤ A¯.
This property does not follow from our requirements.
We have shown that, given any preference structure
satisfying (Q1)–(Q6), the relation described in Defini-
tion 5 is a generalized qualitative probability (g.q.p.).
4 PROPERTIES OF GENERALIZED
QUALITATIVE PROBABILITY
Let us now consider properties of generalized quali-
tative probabilities. Most of the properties we shall
prove are needed in the proof of Theorem 1, others are
of independent interest. For lack of space, proofs will
not be given.
Lemma 14 • An event A is null iff ∅ ≤ A.
• In a g.q.p., A ⊆ B implies A ≤ B.
• A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅, A ∪D < B ∪D ⇒ A < B.
• A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅, A < B, D < B ∪D ⇒
A ∪D < B ∪D.
• If A ∩B = ∅, A′ ≤ A and B′ ≤ B, then
A′ ∪B′ ≤ A ∪B.
• If A ∩B = ∅ and ∅ < A ∪B, then either
A < A ∪B or B < A ∪B.
A fundamental notion is needed to study further the
properties of g.q.p.
Definition 7 We shall say that A is negligible with
respect to B, and write A≪ B iff B 6≤ ∅ and
A ∪B ≤ B −A.
The intuition is that A is negligible w.r.t. B iff
both A ∩B and A−B are negligible w.r.t. B, i.e.,
B ≤ B − (A ∩B) and B ≤ B ∪ (A−B). The proper-
ties of the relation ≪ are many and delicate to prove.
Again no proofs will be given. The main result we
need about≪ (all needed properties will easily follow)
is that ≪ is modular, i.e., if A≪ C, then, for any B,
either A≪ B, or B ≪ C. The term modular is taken
from Gra¨tzer [Gra¨tzer, 1971]).
Lemma 15 • If A ⊆ B ≪ C, then A≪ C.
• If A≪ B ⊆ C, then A≪ C.
• If A≪ B, then A < B.
• Assume B ⊆ C. If A≪ C, then either A≪ B or
B ≪ C.
• Assume B ∩ C = ∅. If A≪ C, then either
A≪ B or B ≪ C.
• If A≪ C, then, for any B, either A≪ B or
B ≪ C.
• If A ≤ B ≪ C ≤ D, then A≪ D.
• If A≪ B and A′ ≪ B, then A ∪ A′ ≪ B.
• If A≪ B ∪B′, then either A≪ B or A≪ B′.
• If A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅ and A ∪D ≤ B ∪D, then
either A ≤ B or A≪ B ∪D.
• If A ∩D = B ∩D = ∅ and A ∪D ≤ B ∪D, then
either A ≤ B or (A ∪B)≪ D.
• If A ∩D = ∅ and A ∪D ≤ B ∪D, then either
A ≤ B or (A ∪B)≪ D.
• If A ∩B = ∅, A ∪B ≤ A′ ∪B′ and B′ ≤ B, then
either A ≤ A′ or (A ∪ A′)≪ B′.
It may now been shown that there is no additional
property that should be added to the definition of
g.q.p.
Theorem 1 If ≤ is a generalized qualitative proba-
bility, there is a preference structure satisfying (Q1)–
(Q6) that defines it, in the sense of Definition 5.
Proof: Lef F = {high, low}. Since acts can take only
two values, every act is of the form whigh,lowA for some
event A (A is the set of states on which the act takes
the value high). We shall drop the upper index and
write wA. Let us define:
wA ≤D wB iff (D ∩A)≪ D or A ∩D ≤ B ∩D.
Notice immediately that wA ≤A∪B wB iff A≪ B or
A ≤ B, which holds iff A ≤ B. Therefore ≤ is the
relation defined by the preferences on acts that have
been just defined and the only task left to us is to
check that postulates (Q1)–(Q6) are satisfied. In fact
property (R) is also satisfied. The proof will appear in
the full paper.
5 FURTHER RESULTS
5.1 FAMILIES OF GENERALIZED
QUALITATIVE PROBABILITIES
A number of interesting families of generalized quali-
tative probabilities may be defined.
Definition 8 • A g.q.p. is total iff for any events
A, B, either A ≤ B or B ≤ A.
• A g.q.p. is standard iff A ∩B = ∅ and A 6= ∅ im-
ply B < A ∪B.
• A g.q.p. is purely non-standard iff A < B implies
B −A ∼ A ∪B.
The g.q.p. generated by classical probabilistic mod-
els, as described just before Lemma 8, are both to-
tal and standard. Standard structures are generated
by preference stuctures that satisfy a strengthening of
(Q4), excluding the second possibility in the conclu-
sion. A g.q.p. is standard iff it satisfies the condition:
A ≤ B implies B¯ ≤ A¯. The g.q.p. generated by the
non-standard probabilistic models there are total but
not always standard. The g.q.p. generated by total
orderings on S as described there are total and purely
non-standard. Any purely non-standard g.q.p. is to-
tal.
Conjecture: any generalized qualitative plausibility
structure is the intersection of all the total g.q.p. that
extend it. This conjecture stands, even though such
structures are not closed under intersection.
Open problems include the search for a uniform way of
generating all generalized qualitative probabilities and
the consideration of utility theory on these structures.
The framework presented here should allow for a de-
cider to specify only a list of pairs of acts that enter
the relations <A, for different A’s and this should de-
fine a system of preferences satisfying our postulates.
How should this system be defined?
5.2 EQUIVALENCE OF ACTS THAT
TAKE THE SAME VALUES ON
EQUIVALENT EVENTS
Let us return to the analogue of Theorem 5.2.1
of Savage [Savage, 1954]: two acts that take the
same values on events that are pairwise equiva-
lent necessarily equivalent. Suppose, on some event
A, acts f and g take only a finite set of values
ci, i = 0, . . . , n. Define, for any such i, Fi (resp.
Gi) to be the event on which act f (resp. g)
gets value ci. Formally, Fi
def
= {s ∈ A | f(s) = ci} and
Gi
def
= {s ∈ A | g(s) = ci}. Suppose, moreover that, for
every i, Fi ∼ Gi. We expect this to imply that f ∼A g.
I could not prove that this is implied by (Q1)–(Q6) and
I conjecture it is not, but I still lack a counter-example.
But an additional, very natural, postulate implies this
conclusion. This additional postulate will be presented
now. Notice that it is a natural postulate on prefer-
ences that is completely original, in the sense that it
does not resemble any of Savage’s postulates. Savage’s
Theorem 5.2.1 requires his Postulate P6, that assumes
the existence of fine partitions. No requirement of the
sort will be needed here.
(Q7) If A ∩B = ∅, A ∪B ⊆ D, wc,dA ≤A∪B w
c,d
B ,
f =A d, g =B d, f
′ =A c, g
′ =B c,
f ′ =D−A f, g
′ =D−B g
and f ≤D g then f
′ ≤D g
′.
The meaning of (Q7) is the following. One concludes
f ′ ≤D g′ because f ≤D g and f ′ is very similar to f
and g′ is very similar to g: f ′ =D−A f and g
′ =D−B g.
The difference between f ′ and f (and g′ and g) lies in
the fact that, where f has value d on A, f ′ has value
c there (and where g has value d on A, g′ has value
c there). To simplify things, suppose d < c. Then
f ′ is better than f and g′ is better than g and the
difference lies in the difference between c and d and
the respective sizes of A and B. The assumption that
w
c,d
A ≤A∪B w
c,d
B implies, given that d < c, that B is at
least as probable as A (at least as far as d and c are
concerned, since we have no postulate implying this
does not depend on the prizes d and c). In this case,
improving g on B (by going fromn d to c) is at least as
significant as improving f on A in the same way, and,
therefore, f ′ cannot be preferred to g′.
In (Q7), we assumed that A and B were disjoint. One
easily sees that this assumption may be dropped: con-
sider A′
def
= A−B and B′
def
= B −A and then use the
Sure Thing Principle, Lemma 5.
With the help of (Q7), we can prove the following ana-
logue to Savage’s Theorem 5.2.1.
Theorem 2 Assume preferences on acts satisfy
(Q1)–(Q7). Let Z be a finite subset of the set F of con-
sequences, f and g acts, and let A be an event. Assume
that, for any s ∈ A, both f(s) and g(s) are elements
of Z. For any z ∈ Z, let φz
def
= {s ∈ A | f(s) = z} and
ψz
def
= {s ∈ A | g(s) = z}. Assume that, for any z ∈ Z,
φz ∼ ψz. Then, f ∼A g.
Proof: By induction on the size of Z. If Z is empty,
then A is empty and the claim holds by (Q2). If Z
has one element, then f =A g and the claim holds by
(Q2). Let us assume that Z has n + 1 elements for
n ≥ 1 and that the claim holds for Z of size n.
Let zi, i = 0, 1 be distinct elements of Z. Define f
′ to
be equal to f , except on φz0 where it is equal to z1. De-
fine g′ to be equal to g, except on ψz0 where it is equal
to z1. On A, f
′ and g′ take only n different values.
Since φzi ∼ ψzi , for i = 0, 1, by Lemma 14, we have
φz0 ∪ φz1 ∼ ψz0 ∪ ψz1 and the assumptions of Theo-
rem 2 hold and, by the induction hypothesis, f ′ ∼A g′.
The conclusion that f ∼A g now follows from (Q7) (we
noticed above the restriction that the events A and B
of (Q7) be disjoint could be removed), since φz0 ∼ ψz0
imply
w
z0,z1
φz0
≤φz0∪ψz0 w
z0,z1
ψz0
.
The results above may contain an avenue to strengthen
Savage’s results by weakening his (P6). It may be
possible to replace, in the proof of Savage’s Theorem
5.3.4, his postulate (P6) by the weaker (Q7) and some
assumption, similar to Scott’s [Scott, 1964], implying
that subjective probabilities are defined by probability
measures.
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